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Bruce (1983) and Bruce and Valentine (1986) for face recognition, 
the effect was demonstrated for closely associated pairs of people, 
for example John Lennon–Paul McCartney: seeing one sped up 
recognition of the other compared to control conditions where 
either unrelated famous or unknown faces were presented first. 
The effect crosses domains in that seeing for example Paul Simon’s 
face speeds up the recognition of Art Garfunkel’s name (Young 
et al., 1988). This result and Rhodes and Tremewan’s (1993) finding 
that name–face and face–face semantic priming effects are similar 
in terms of signal detection sensitivity, demonstrated that these 
effects are unlikely to be due to mechanisms at the perceptual level. 
Rather they are taken to be due to spreading activation between 
representations in semantic memory.
The finding that the sequential or simultaneous presentation of 
two associated people may result in an acceleration in responding 
(associative priming; Bruce, 1983) is in support for both, the cat-
egorical and the associative point of view. While associative priming 
is distinguished by the fact that it is based on close associations 
between two people who are often thought of together, perhaps 
seen together, and are predictive of each other, in the sense that 
given one name, one can generate the other, categorical priming 
is based on a purely incidental sharing of the same category, for 
example the singers Ricky Martin and Eminem, or the politicians 
Nicolas Sarkozy and Sarah Palin. Some studies have questioned the 
1 IntroductIon
There has been a long-standing controversy in the scientific lit-
erature that revolves around the question of whether memory for 
people has an associative or a hierarchically organized categorical 
structure. For the semantic system dealing with objects, a network-
like structure as proposed by Collins and Quillian (1969) is a largely 
accepted model. These networks are supposed to be organized along 
categorical lines such that superordinates are connected to subordi-
nates. For the semantic representation of people, some researchers 
have expressed doubts that it is organized in that way. Rather, it 
has been suggested that it is organized along associative lines, such 
that there may be a direct link between two persons (Young et al., 
1994; Barry et al., 1998).
The main empirical workhorses for the investigation of semantic 
memory are priming paradigms which vary the subject’s “degree 
of preparedness” over the course of the experiment. One class of 
priming effects is known generically as semantic priming. It was 
in the domain of word recognition that semantic priming was first 
reported (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971), and referred to the find-
ing that related word pairs, for example bread–butter, were more 
quickly recognized than unrelated word pairs. In person identifica-
tion, semantic priming thus refers to the phenomenon that seeing 
one person (be it their face or name, for example) can affect the 
speed of recognition of another related person. First reported by 
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existence of such categorical priming effects (Young et al., 1994; 
Barry et al., 1998) and suggested that only people that are closely 
associated will be linked together in semantic memory. However, 
there is accumulating evidence that pairs of faces that came from 
the same occupational category result in shorter response times 
(Brennen and Bruce, 1991; Carson and Burton, 2001; Darling and 
Valentine, 2005; Stone and Valentine, 2007; Stone, 2008; Wiese and 
Schweinberger, 2008, 2011; Darling et al., 2010).
The most influential categorical model is the interactive activa-
tion and competition (IAC) model of person identification that 
has been introduced by Burton et al. (1990) and extended, among 
others, by Burton (1994), Brédart et al. (1995), and Burton et al. 
(1999). These authors suggested and implemented a connectionist 
architecture as developed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1990) 
that consists of pools of mutually inhibitory nodes representing 
the content of semantic memory (see Figure 1 for a graphical 
representation). The pools are organized hierarchically, such 
that the flow of information is restricted. The model does not 
attempt to include the computationally complex perceptual proc-
ess of recognizing a face, i.e., to match a given retinal image to 
the corresponding representation stored in long-term memory 
(but see Burton et al., 1999). Instead, the model’s entry point are 
the face recognition units (FRU), a perceptual stage where the 
activation of a unit represents a match between the visual input 
and the stored structural description of a specific person’s face. 
Similarly, name recognition units (NRU) are perceptual units for 
names. Nodes from these pools converge at the person identity 
nodes (PIN) that are an abstract representation of the amount of 
evidence there is for a given person (independent of whether the 
evidence was received from a face, a name, visually, auditory, or 
any other perceptual pathway).
That means, each unit within the FRU and the NRU pools is con-
nected bidirectionally with a unit in the pool of PINs: for instance, 
Ole Gunnar Solskjær’s FRU and NRU are connected with his PIN 
unit. In the model, suprathreshold activation at the PIN allows a 
familiarity decision to a person to be taken. They also present the 
exclusive pathway to the semantic information units (SIU). Each 
SIU represents a biographical characteristic of a person, i.e., a single 
piece of semantic information that is known to the observer. Typical 
examples quoted in the literature are, e.g., an SIU for “French,” 
for “comedian,” or for “prime minister.” Each known fact about 
a particular person is represented by a bidirectional link between 
that person’s PIN and a SIU. Thus the semantic information is not 
directly linked to the representation of a persons face, but is always 
accessed via the abstract, modality-independent PINs.
As shown for example by Burton et al. (1999), this simple archi-
tecture is very well-suited to account for a large range of empirical 
phenomena related to person recognition. These include identity 
priming, associative and categorical priming, the fan-effect, and 
distinctiveness effects. Associative and categorical priming, for 
example, are emergent features of the architecture’s dynamics. 
The mechanism for both types of priming is as follows: when the 
face of a person from a related pair is seen, say Brad Pitt, his FRU 
is activated, which activates his PIN, allowing a familiarity deci-
sion to be taken. Relevant SIUs, for example actor, American, are 
simultaneously being activated in a cascade fashion. As they are 
activated, each SIU will begin to activate all PINs connected to it, 
i.e., all PINs connected to “American” and all PINs connected to 
“actor.” Thus when Angelina Jolie’s or Tom Cruise’s face is presented 
shortly afterward, the corresponding PIN has a non-zero activation 
level because of the shared semantics and will be recognized more 
quickly than if Brad Pitt had not just been presented. Note that in 
this model priming is modality-independent because it is predicted 
to be equivalent whether the prime and target are faces, names or 
any other key to identity.
The SIUs represent the semantic information known by the 
observer about a given individual. The exact nature of the SIUs, 
however, has not been clearly specified, i.e., it is unclear whether 
these units correspond to single biographical incidents such as “died 
in a car accident,” or whether only stronger, category-like informa-
tion such as “is a comedian” or “is American” are stored at that level 
(Brédart et al., 1995). Still, an assumption of the model is that all 
connections between PINs and SIUs are of equal strength. This is a 
potentially vulnerable point in the model, as it does not allow one 
to model how memory traces of different strengths are encoded 
which is obviously the case in real-life representations of people. 
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Figure 1 | interactive activation and competition (iAC) model. Red lines are inhibitory connections, blue arrows are excitatory. Note that access to the semantic 
information is routed exclusively via the PINs.
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the finding emerges quite  naturally, as we will show in the next 
sections. We therefore argue that it is crucial to test predictions 
in an implementation of the model similarly to how we test 
predictions empirically.
Furthermore, previous simulations typically used small net-
works with very simple connectivity (Burton et al., 1990). Studies 
using such networks do not allow to derive predictions about 
the behavior of the model in general, i.e., when a more complex 
connectivity is employed since the network’s behavior can change 
drastically with the structure. In our simulations, we choose a 
statistical approach to derive predictions from the model: We 
randomly draw samples from the population of possible net-
works and calculate population statistics across these samples. 
This approach allows us to generalize to arbitrary connectivity. 
Our view is that the investigation of simple versions of network 
models is worthwhile for understanding the mechanisms that 
produce a specific effect. However, it is also of importance to 
generalize these ideas to more complex instances of the same 
model in order to show that it is not an artifact of the simplified 
version of the model.
Our simulations are therefore based on random networks and 
we present statistical data that are acquired by submitting the same 
task to many different such networks. We use medium-sized net-
works and keep its size as well as the expected number of excitatory 
connections constant, only randomizing the actual connectivity. 
This is unavoidable, because all major parameters depend on the 
size and approximate number of connections and have to be fine-
tuned for different sizes (see Table A1 and Appendix for details on 
the simulations).
3 SImulatIonS 1 and 2
3.1 SemantIc prImIng In a famIlIarIty-decISIon taSk
The semantic priming effect as observed in the familiarity-decision 
task (for example, Bruce and Valentine, 1986) is, in terms of the IAC 
model, based on activation spreading from the externally activated 
PIN (for example by visual presentation via FRUs or NRUs) to the 
connected SIUs which, in turn, propagate the activity to other PINs 
sharing the same nodes. Conceptually, a single shared SIU could 
be enough to elicit an activation in another PIN. This is true for 
simplified networks that have very few SIUs and a simple excitatory 
connectivity between PINs and SIUs where it is possible to find a 
semantic priming effect even for a single shared SIU. However, this 
does not hold for larger networks with more complex connectiv-
ity. We argue that it is a strength when a prediction of the model 
is independent of the network’s size and connectivity because it 
allows us to conclude about a class of models rather than a single 
realization.
In a first experiment with the model, we investigated whether 
the semantic priming effect reported in previous simulations was 
present in our model. We therefore excited an arbitrary NRU from 
the network and observe whether any semantic priming could 
be observed. Semantic priming depends on self-sustained activ-
ity propagating from shared SIUs to related PINs. Therefore, we 
counted the number of above-zero activations after switching off 
the external activity and letting the network settle to an equilibrium. 
All above-zero activations in the PIN pool result in some amount 
of semantic priming when subsequently subjected to external input 
Nevertheless, the assumption of equal connection-strengths is a 
necessary characteristic of the model because it reduces the degrees 
of freedom and prevents the model from overfitting.
The only way to represent memories of variable strengths while 
retaining the assumption of equal connection weights, is to model 
memory strength in terms of a different number of SIUs for memo-
ries of different strengths (for example “comedian” would not be 
modeled by a single SIU but would rather activate a large number 
of more basic SIUs, such as “tells jokes,” “is quick-witted,” or “per-
forms in front of an audience”). These “basic” SIUs however would 
still have the same weight1. This view is similar to that expressed 
by Brédart et al. (1995). In their extension of the IAC model, these 
authors clustered related semantic information into groups accord-
ing to categorical similarity.
In the following, we will investigate the structure of memory for 
people in a series of three experiments. We base our experimental 
efforts on an implementation of the IAC model of person identi-
fication from which we derive concrete predictions. The paper is 
therefore organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce 
our computational implementation and derive predictions for 
Experiments 1 and 2 that are subsequently presented. The results 
from these studies provoke a change in our paradigm for which we 
present a model before discussing Experiment 3.
2 the computatIonal model
Burton et al.’s (1990) IAC model has had great influence in the 
literature on the organization of person-related semantic knowl-
edge. This is due to the fact that in spite of its simplicity it is able to 
account for many of the observed effects. Another useful aspect is 
that the model is implemented as a coupled non-linear system and 
can thus be used to make quantitative predictions when adapted 
to specific paradigms.
However, this potential is not exploited by most studies because, 
instead of using a concrete computational implementation, the 
model is often used to derive predictions only in a heuristic manner. 
These studies operate by trying to envisage what the dynamic model 
would do when subjected to the specific manipulations in the novel 
paradigm. However, given the complexity of the dynamics in the 
network-like structure, it is often very hard or near-impossible to 
predict how it would behave under novel circumstances. Important 
side-effects are easily overlooked that can counteract the presumed 
processes and lead to different behavior of the model.
We illustrate this argument by way of an example: By concep-
tually elaborating on the IAC model, one might be tempted to 
think that any number of shared SIUs will invariably result in a 
semantic priming effect in a primed familiarity task. We show 
below that this is not true in general: Depending on the con-
nectivity of the network, as well as the nature of the employed 
task, there is a critical number of SIUs that need to be shared 
in order for semantic priming to emerge. This effect is hard to 
derive from a heuristic use of Burton et al.’s model. However, 
when looking at a concrete implementation of the IAC model, 
1Varying the number of involved SIUs is not identical to changing the connection 
strengths between PINs and SIUs. A larger number of active SIUs implies stronger 
inhibitory activity within the SIU pool. This side-effect could potentially lead to 
different effects from directly increasing connection weights.
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We conclude that whether categorical priming takes place in a 
single-familiarity-decision task depends on whether the number of 
SIUs activated via the shared category will exceed the necessary criti-
cal number or not. In principle, this will depend on properties of the 
network’s connectivity, e.g., exclusiveness (i.e., are there many PINs 
that share the SIUs in the network?) and typicality (i.e., there will 
be more shared connections between two actors that are typical). 
Empirical investigations that have focused on priming effects in single-
familiarity-decision tasks that are based on a smaller set of shared 
nodes, i.e., categorical priming studies (Young et al., 1994; Barry et al., 
1998; Stone, 2008; Wiese and Schweinberger, 2011) have had mixed 
success in finding a significant main effect of the same category.
Along these lines, our simulation results fit remarkably well 
with a recent finding by Stone (2008): These authors showed that 
the presence of closely associated pairs in the trial-sequence will 
prevent the more subtle categorical priming effect from occur-
ring, an effect that they explained by different levels of processing 
triggered by the presence of highly associated pairs. The previous 
simulation can explain this effect without requiring the assump-
tion of different processing mechanisms: It attributes this effect 
to increased inhibition when strongly associated pairs have been 
activated in the past that is due to residual activation from the 
previous presentations. Consider again the presentation of Brad 
Pitt and Angelina Jolie as a prime–probe pair. According to the IAC 
model, all other actors will be inhibited because of the dominant 
activation of the two associated PINs. Hence, when an actor is 
presented in the next prime, activation will take longer, poten-
tially leading to a reduced priming effect. In contrast, using only 
categorical prime–probe pairs, the weaker activations will spread 
to all actors, leading to a facilitation for the next categorical prime 
and a potential increase of the priming effect. It is therefore not 
necessary to assume additional mechanisms (like level of process-
ing, for example) but one can account for Stone’s (2008) effect 
purely within the basic IAC-framework.
We conclude that it will be difficult to detect subtle semantic 
priming effects with a single-familiarity-decision task. We there-
fore consider a paradigm that provides a better chance to observe 
semantic priming when there are a lower number of shared features. 
Studies using a double-familiarity task were able to demonstrate 
reliable semantic priming effects in the study of objects (Lupker, 
1988), words (Fischler, 1977), and faces (Brennen and Bruce, 1991). 
The double-familiarity task is distinguished from the usual famili-
arity task by the fact that two words, objects or faces are presented 
simultaneously. Participants are required to respond with “familiar” 
only when both are familiar. The literature showing stable priming 
effects in this task led us to presume that it was more suited for the 
investigation of semantic priming effects that are based on a lower 
number of shared semantics. We therefore investigated priming 
effects in this task within our implementation.
3.2 SemantIc prImIng In a double-famIlIarIty decISIon
In contrast to the single-familiarity-decision task, the priming effect 
in a double-familiarity task is not based on persisting activation 
from a previous presentation of a related person. Rather, the two 
linked persons are both activated thus receiving reciprocal feedback. 
We hypothesize that the priming effect should therefore be less 
dependent of the number of shared features: Because the external 
and we therefore did not consider the absolute values of the above-
zero activations (though the higher the above-zero activity, the 
stronger the priming effect is going to be).
Figure 2 plots the number of primed nodes as a function of the 
maximum number of SIUs shared by the activated and any other 
PIN. Only PINs that receive some activation via SIU-connections 
from the externally stimulated target PIN will produce a difference 
in reaction time in a succeeding trial. Hence, a minimum number of 
four shared SIUs was necessary to produce a semantic priming effect 
in our medium-sized model. We conclude, that there is a critical 
number of shared SIUs that is necessary to elicit above-zero activa-
tion and therefore semantic priming effects in the associated PINs. 
This number could not be changed by adjusting the global model 
parameters (e.g., coupling strength, decay constant; see Table A2 
in Appendix), i.e., it is not an artifact of a specific choice of these 
parameters. Rather, it is an effect inherent to the considered model.
In general, there is only a small range of settings for the global 
parameters in which the model exhibits reasonable behavior: Only 
when the parameters are within a certain regime can semantic 
priming be observed at all without producing unstable network 
responses. Within this regime, the discussed critical number of 
shared nodes was constant. This critical number is dependent on 
the connectivity and the number of nodes in the network.
Technically, the effect that there is a critical number of shared 
SIUs can be explained as follows: The semantic priming effect relies 
on the rather delicate balance between external and internal excita-
tion and inhibition. Stimulating PIN 1 that has only a single shared 
SIU with PIN 2 will result in some activation passing via the shared 
SIU-link. However, there is strong competition in the PIN pool 
and the activity of PIN 1 will actually inhibit PIN 2 (and so will 
other incidental PIN 1 → SIU → PIN 3 links). Thus, depending 
on the connectivity and size of the network there will be a different 
number of SIUs that need to be shared between PIN 1 and 2 to 
produce semantic priming.
Also in larger networks, as the number of connected SIUs is 
increased, so does the overlap with PINs other than the one inves-
tigated. This overlap in turn will increase the activity in the PINs 
leading to increased inhibition that will suppress the activity com-
ing from the weakly coupled few-feature-overlap SIU. By way of 
example, presentation of Brad Pitt will activate related PINs (say 
Jennifer Aniston and Angelina Jolie) and this activation will inhibit 
associations that are of a more subtle nature like Tom Cruise.
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Figure 2 | Number of PiNs with above-zero activation after external 
input to a target PiN as a function of maximum Siu-overlap of the target 
and any other PiN. The plot shows the median over 10 different random 
networks along with the first and fourth quantile.
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course) and the only difference was, whether a single or two NRUs 
were stimulated at once. The double-familiarity task has therefore 
conceptually superior potential to measure subtle priming effects.
In the following experiment, we will investigate semantic priming 
based on few overlapping features (categorical) and many overlap-
ping features (associative priming) within a double-familiarity task.
4 experIment 1
As pointed out by Carson and Burton (2001), because in Burton 
et al.’s model associative priming arises due to shared semantic prop-
erties, priming between members of the same occupational category 
is expected. Associative and categorical priming from this point of 
view are based on exactly the same process (namely shared semantic 
information) differing only in the number of units involved in the 
process. While associative priming is conceived to involve a large 
number of shared SIUs, their number would be considerably less for 
categorical pairs and a less strong priming effect is expected. This 
interpretation fits nicely with Carson and Burton (2001) observa-
tion that in Young et al. (1994) and Barry et al. (1998) and other 
failures to find categorical (and non-associative) priming the non-
significant trend was invariably in the expected direction. This led 
them to speculate that the categorical effect was a weaker version of 
the associative one. To back this up, they demonstrated that if a target 
was primed by four (rather than one) categorical primes then reli-
able priming was obtained, on analyses by participants and by items.
Stable priming effects of categorically related pairs of persons 
have also been shown in a famous/non-famous classification task 
using primes that were subliminally presented (Stone and Valentine, 
2007). Wiese and Schweinberger (2011) implemented a standard 
single-familiarity-decision task and reduced the possibility of stra-
tegic behavior (e.g., expectancy) by using sandwich-masked primes. 
Using that approach, a categorical priming effect did emerge in 
a single-familiarity paradigm. Other recent studies adapted the 
release from proactive interference (RPI) paradigm (Gardiner 
et al., 1972) for faces that were categorically related (Darling and 
Valentine, 2005; Darling et al., 2010). RPI manifests as an advantage 
in memory performance in list-learning tasks, when the learned 
items change the category from which they were drawn. The decline 
in performance when many trials from the same category are pre-
sented is argued to be due to persisting activation in the category-
specific SIUs which leads to interference during recall. The change 
of the active category therefore provides a release from this interfer-
ence, leading to improved performance. In their studies, Darling 
and Valentine (2005) and Darling et al. (2010) could show that a 
stable RPI effect emerges for categorically related names.
In Experiment 1, we investigated priming based on (a) shared 
category and (b) strong association in a double-familiarity task 
using famous names as stimuli. By implementing both categorical 
and associative priming in a single experiment we are able to assess 
the relative strength of the effects. Previous studies that applied the 
double-familiarity task used images of faces of famous persons as 
stimuli. While there is no particular reason to believe that the pres-
entation of names instead of faces should influence the observed 
priming effects, it is still worthwhile to check that this is actually 
the case. Experiment One can therefore also be seen as a replica-
tion and extension of Brennen and Bruce (1991) using a different 
stimulus-modality.
input, when applied to two nodes at once, is strong enough to elicit 
the secondary path via the SIU between the two PINs, recognition 
of both persons should be facilitated. Also, the priming effect would 
supposedly vary in magnitude with the number of shared nodes, 
where a larger overlap would produce stronger priming effects 
because the “bandwidth” is increased (similar to the situation in 
the single-familiarity-decision task).
We investigated this hypothesis in a model-experiment. To simu-
late the requirements of the double-familiarity task, we simultane-
ously activated two random NRUs that shared a number of SIUs 
(the priming condition) or two NRUs that did not share any SIU 
(the control condition). We measured the model’s “reaction time” 
which we define to be the crossing of a threshold at the PIN level 
and calculate priming effects as the difference between a priming 
and a control condition. The model RT was chosen as the dependent 
variable in this simulation in order to investigate the magnitude 
of the priming effects as compared to the previous simulation in 
which only the existence of priming was of interest. When there are 
few shared SIUs, the situation corresponds to categorical priming 
and when there are many, it corresponds to associative priming.
Figure 3 plots the result of this experiment. Obviously, increas-
ing the number of overlapping SIUs results in a decrease in reaction 
time, a priming effect. Already the single-feature overlap turns out 
to be significant in a one-way ANOVA, F(1,38) = 23.98, p < 0.001 
and so do, of course, priming effects with more shared features.
3.3 concluSIon
Based on the simulation results, we conclude that it should in prin-
ciple be possible to produce priming based on very few (and even 
a single) overlapping biographical features in a double-familiarity 
task. As such, the double-familiarity task does not simply imply 
“twice the amount of priming” but rather there are different 
mechanisms underlying the single- and double-familiarity tasks. 
Note however, that this distinction is not an artificially introduced 
one (like the underlying mechanisms for identity and semantic 
priming within the IAC-model, for example) but that it emerges 
naturally within the model, when only the mode of stimulation is 
changed. The model in the two reported simulations was exactly the 
same (apart from the randomness of the network’s connectivity, of 
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Figure 3 | Model reaction time for a familiarity decision in a double-
familiarity task as a function of shared features between the two presented 
names. The plot shows the mean value and SD over 20 different random 
networks. The gray line marks the control condition with zero-feature-overlap.
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4.1.3 Design
This was a mixed design. The within-subjects factor was Priming, 
with the levels of Related and Unrelated. The between-subject 
factor was Relatedness Type where one group of participants 
saw Associatively related pairs in the Related condition, and 
the other group saw Categorically related pairs. Twenty-five 
participants were randomly allocated to the Associative con-
dition and 25 to the Categorical condition. Each participant 
performed 18 familiarity judgments to related trials and 18 to 
unrelated trials, where the required response was affirmative, 
and 36 trials containing unfamiliar names, to which the correct 
response was negative. The conditions were presented in a dif-
ferent random order for each participant, with the constraints 
that no more than three from the same condition could be 
presented consecutively, and no more than four trials requir-
ing the same response could be presented consecutively. Across 
the experiment, both groups of participants made familiarity 
judgments to the same names, just arranged in different pairs 
in the Related condition.
4.1.4 Procedure
The experiment was controlled with ERTS software on a color 
monitor. Participants were tested individually, and instructed that 
on each trial two names would be presented, one above the other. 
Their task was to press “Yes” if both names were those of famous 
people, and “No” otherwise. Stimuli were presented until a response 
was forthcoming, and the inter-trial interval was 1000 ms. There 
were 20 warm-up trials not used in the analysis, where 10 contained 
one or two unfamous names, and 10 contained 2 famous peo-
ple’s names, of whom 3 were related (associatively or categorically, 
according to condition) and 7 were unrelated. None of the famous 
names were also included in the experiment proper. No explicit 
reference was made to the possibility that some of the people may 
be related to each other.
4.2 reSultS
The number of errors and the mean response time for correct 
responses were computed for the Related and Unrelated con-
ditions, and are shown in Table 1. The error data were entered 
into a two-way ANOVA with the factors of Relatedness Type 
and Priming. There was a main effect of Priming, F(1,48) = 7.4, 
p < 0.05, no main effect of Relatedness Type F(1,48) < 1, qualified 
by a  significant interaction, F(1,48) = 6.1, p < 0.05. T-tests showed 
that the Associative group had fewer errors in the Related condition 
than in the Unrelated, t(24) = 3.0, p < 0.05, but that there was no 
difference for the Categorical group, t(24) < 1.
4.1 method
4.1.1 Participants
Fifty undergraduate students were recruited from the University of 
Tromsø campus. Their average age was 24 (range 20–37, SD = 3.7), 
and the 18 women and 7 men were randomly assigned to each 
subgroup (see Design). They received no reward for taking part 
in the experiment. All ratings were performed by students from 
the Social Sciences Faculty, mainly the Department of Psychology, 
within the same age range as the eventual participants, also with 
a majority of women.
4.1.2 Stimuli
For this experiment we wished to obtain pairs of celebrities that 
shared an increasing amount of semantic information. In addition, 
we wanted to keep other factors as constant as possible between 
the conditions. This led us to the approach of finding pairs of 
strongly related pairs that could also be recombined to produce 
pairs that were only categorically related. We chose celebrities from 
different categories that appear together, for example Michael 
Douglas–Catherine Zeta-Jones, Kate Winslet–Leonardo Di Caprio 
and should thus share a large number of semantic information. We 
then recombined them in a way that they were apparently unre-
lated, e.g., Michael Douglas–Leonardo Di Caprio, Kate Winslet–
Catherine Zeta-Jones but were of the same profession such that 
they still shared a number of common semantics (see Table A3 in 
Appendix for a list).
In order to achieve this, a list was generated of 47 related pairs 
of celebrities likely to be known to our participant population. 
A further 26 pairs of people, some of whom were weakly related 
and some of whom were unrelated, were mixed in with the closely 
related pairs. Nine people rated the strength of relatedness within 
these pairs by answering the question: “How related are the people 
in each of these pairs, on a scale of 1–7, where 1 means completely 
unrelated and 7 means the most tight relationship imaginable.” 
They were also asked to indicate when they did not know a celebrity.
Twenty-nine pairs fulfilled the criteria of being known by at least 
7 of the 9 raters, and where the mean rated strength of relatedness 
was over 5.5. Two more lists were made, each with one name from 
each of these 29 related pairs. Sixteen people – eight per list – who 
did not take part in the previous phase were asked to write down 
as many people as possible that each celebrity made them think 
of, and to indicate when a name was not familiar to them. These 
participants generated a mean of 3.4 names per person. In addi-
tion to the criterion of mean associative relatedness, the pairs that 
were used in the experiment were those where (a) at least 14 of 
the participants who saw each name in the stimulus preparation 
procedures described above knew both of the celebrities, and (b) 
where at least two pairs from the same occupational category passed 
the first two criteria and could be recombined into two related pairs 
without strong association, i.e., that were never generated in the free 
association procedure above. This gave a total of 36 celebrities that 
could be combined into 18 associatively or categorically related pairs.
The stimuli pairs in the Unrelated condition were obtained by 
combining the stimuli in the related conditions, so that they did 
not share association or category. There were two conditions for 
the negative trials: one with one famous name and an unfamous 
name, and one with two unfamous names.
Table 1 | The mean response times in milliseconds for correct responses 
(SD in brackets), and error rates in experiment 2.
 related unrelated Priming 
   effects
 rT (SD) % error rT (SD) % error rT % error
Associative 1151 (231) 7 (9) 1277 (244) 11 (12) 126 4
Categorical 1135 (227) 6 (7) 1201 (242) 7 (7) 66 1
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case: Negative trials are slower compared to positive trials and we 
therefore conclude that matching processes can be excluded as an 
alternative explanation.
Since the same celebrities were used to investigate associative 
priming between participants in the same experiment, we can make 
a statement about the relative size of the effects. Although numeri-
cally bigger, the priming effect was not statistically larger for the 
associative pairs than the categorical, either by items or by partici-
pants. Our simulations showed a correlation between priming effect 
and number of overlapping features. However, when considering 
Figure 3, the curve asymptotically approaches a fixed value. The 
lack of an effect between a strong and even stronger overlap of SIUs 
(categorical vs. associative) could therefore be attributed to the fact 
that categorical relation is already too strong for the additional 
association to make a difference (because a strong difference has 
only a weak effect in terms of RT for higher values of number of 
shared SIUs). Relating these considerations back to the data on hand 
and assuming that categorical and associative priming are based on 
the same mechanisms (Carson and Burton, 2001), it might just be 
the case that the additional overlap in semantics for the associative 
pairs was not strong enough to elicit a significantly larger effect.
When pushing the assumption that both categorical and asso-
ciative priming differ only in the number of shared semantics to 
the limit, the question appears whether a single common semantic 
feature is sufficient to produce priming.
5 experIment 2
In all work carried out so far in person identification, priming due 
to the relationship between two people has relied on relatively stable 
aspects of the peoples’ lives, the essence of the identity of the person. 
For example Barack Obama and Joe Biden are associated because 
they work in the same Democrat administration. Laurel and Hardy 
are so closely related that it is unclear what the meaning of one 
would be independently of the other. Similarly for categorically 
related pairs, the profession is normally why people are connected, 
for example Tom Cruise and Mel Gibson are related by both being 
actors, which is absolutely central to why they are known. So, in 
the case of both associative and categorical priming the overlap 
between related items is in terms of the essence of who the person is.
However, some pairs of people are related for reasons not per-
taining to the essence of who they are, but more incidental, ran-
dom or trivial things, sometimes deriving from single episodes. 
For instance, Princess Diana and James Dean, who did not have 
the same profession and lived in different eras, both died in car 
crashes; boxer Evander Holyfield and painter Vincent van Gogh 
both lost a part of their ear at some point, and both Nobel Prize 
Laureate Thomas Mann and “King of Pop” Michael Jackson were 
accused of pedophilia. Note that in none of these cases does the 
titbit of information define the people: they are principally known 
for other reasons. In addition, it will be hard to think of any addi-
tional feature to relate the two persons to one another and any 
observed priming effect could therefore be attributed to that shared 
biographical information.
Experiment 2 investigates this issue by implementing a cor-
responding experiment where we attempted to isolate a single 
shared biographical feature that could in principle correspond to 
an isolated SIU in the IAC model. In continuation of the previous 
The mean correct response times were entered into a two-
way ANOVA with the same factors, where there was a signifi-
cant main effect of Priming, F(1,48) = 30.2, p < 0.001, but no 
main effect of Relatedness Type, F(1,48) < 1 nor an interaction, 
F(1,48) = 2.2, p > 0.1. In other words, the response time advan-
tage of the Related condition over the Unrelated appears to be 
as strong for the Categorical condition as for the Associative. A 
two-way ANOVA was also performed with items as random factor, 
and correct response times as dependent variable. There were two 
between-items factors of Priming and Relatedness Type. There was 
a significant main effect of Priming, F(1,34) = 21.1, p < 0.001, and a 
marginal one of Relatedness Type, F(1,34) = 3.6, p = 0.066, because 
participants in the Categorical group recognized the names slightly 
more quickly than participants in the Associative group, but again 
no interaction between the two factors, F(1,34) = 1.02, ns. An 
independent samples two-tailed t-test for the Categorical items 
showed a difference between the Related and Unrelated conditions, 
t(34) = 2.4, p < 0.05.
Finally, we compared negative trials in which participants were 
required to give “unfamiliar” judgments with unrelated trials (in 
which a “familiar” decision was correct). In two-tailed paired 
t-tests, Negative trials were slower both for the associative group, 
t(23) = 5.95, p < 0.001 and for the categorical group, t(23) = 4.61, 
p < 0.001.
4.3 dIScuSSIon
When investigating associative and categorical priming within the 
same experimental framework, we found reliable priming effects 
with associatively as well as with categorically related pairs using 
famous names as stimuli. Brennen and Bruce (1991) showed cat-
egorical priming of face recognition on a double-familiarity task 
and Carson and Burton (2001) showed categorical priming of name 
recognition using multiple primes. Experiment 1 bridges the gap 
between these results by revealing categorical priming of name 
recognition using a double-familiarity task. The data is in accord-
ance with structural models of the semantic memory for persons 
postulating a pool of shared semantics, including category.
However, there is an alternative explanation for these results that 
is not based on spreading activation but rather on strategic match-
ing processes. It has been suggested that a late semantic matching 
process may bias the response in favor of one of the response alter-
natives in binary decision tasks (Neely et al., 1989). This matching 
process has been suggested to function as a plausibility or coherence 
check. In the double-familiarity task, if the participant detects a 
semantic connection, both names must be familiar because else a 
semantic overlap could not have been detected. Therefore, there 
is a perfect contingency between semantic match and familiarity 
and a bias in favor of familiar-decisions would be helpful. On the 
other hand, however, a familiarity decision does not necessarily 
imply a semantic match meaning that an “unfamiliar” bias in case 
of no detected match could be counter-productive. If a match-
ing process was responsible for our effects, we would therefore 
expect that  unrelated trials (in which a familiar-decision had to 
be given) should be slower compared to negative trials (where 
the  unfamiliar-bias is in the correct direction) because in the 
unrelated trials, two names that are familiar contradict the result 
from the matching process. Our results show that this is not the 
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identify the link were included in the experiment. A second list com-
prised the 12 pairs comprised of the same exemplars as the first list, 
but with the pairs re-arranged such that there was no relationship 
(categorical, associative, or biographical) between the pairs. Pairs 
were included only if a set of 10 additional pilot participants failed 
to think of any link between the items. The negative items were 
created where only one of the stimulus items was a famous person; 
the non-famous names were plausible Norwegian or American 
English names; there were 24 such pairs. Responses to these items 
were not analyzed in this experiment.
5.1.3 Design
The independent variable studied here was Relatedness: On trials 
where both names were famous, the people were either Related by 
a single biographical feature, or they were Unrelated. The negative 
items were only included in the experiment in order to provide tri-
als on which participants could answer “no.” No analysis of these 
items was conducted.
5.1.4 Procedure
Participants were tested individually using a program written using 
ERTS software. Each trial began with a fixation point, presented 
in the center of the screen and accompanied by a warning tone, 
presented for 500 ms. A pair of names was then presented on the 
screen, either side of the center point. Half of these pairs were 
negative items containing non-famous names, one-quarter were 
from the related list and the remainder from the unrelated list. 
This display was visible for 2500 ms. Participants were instructed 
to respond by pressing “z” in the case of both names being those of 
famous people, and “m” if both names were not those of celebrities 
(i.e., only one or no celebrities). Participants were asked to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible. The names display cleared 
after 2500 ms and there was a further 2500 ms inter-trial interval 
where participants were still able to respond. The next trial began 
immediately.
5.2 reSultS
Median correct response times were taken for each participant, 
removing all RTs below 200 ms and over 3000 ms. The mean for the 
Related condition was 1227 ms (SD = 187), and for the Unrelated 
condition was 1232 ms (SD = 309). A t-test showed no significant 
difference, t(18) = −0.13, p > 0.1. Additionally, error rates were 
subjected to the same analyses. Error rate in the Related condition 
was 10.09 (SD = 13.49) and 10.53 (SD = 16.63) in the Unrelated 
condition. The corresponding t-test yielded an insignificant result, 
t(18) = −0.29, p > 0.1.
5.3 dIScuSSIon
In Experiment 2 there was no evidence of biographical priming 
in a double-familiarity-decision task even though we concluded 
from the model that it should be observable in principle. There 
are several possible reasons for the lack of an effect. First the effect 
of the single shared biographical feature might not have been 
strong enough to be detectable in the double-familiarity para-
digm. Variability in studies on famous persons is rather strong 
because of the different degrees of exposure that participants have 
to celebrities. Furthermore, it is likely that not all participants had 
distinction of “associative” and “categorical” priming and for clarity 
of exposition, we tentatively call this putative effect “biographical” 
priming.
Previous experimental work that focused on related questions 
has been conducted by McNeill and Burton (2002). In two experi-
ments they compared the effect of associative primes to two types 
of unrelated primes: one where the prime and target had the same 
nationality and one where they had different nationalities. On a 
familiarity task and on a nationality categorization task, for faces 
and for names, the associative primes speeded processing, and there 
was no difference between the two Unrelated conditions, suggesting 
that a difference on a single biographical feature is not enough to 
give rise to priming in the standard familiarity-judgment para-
digms. The lack of an effect in their experiment can be interpreted 
in the framework of our simulations: In single-familiarity-decision 
tasks, a critical number of shared features must be present for prim-
ing to emerge. Also, the lack of a difference may be due to the fact 
that the different unrelated conditions were not matched for (dis-)
similarity, i.e., it was not shown that if one disregards the national-
ity, the two conditions were then equally unrelated.
In a recent experiment, Darling and Valentine (2005, Experiment 
4) investigated whether similarity in an ad hoc category was enough 
to elicit release from proactive inhibition. They defined persons 
to be related when both did their job in a sitting (or standing) 
position and did not observe an RPI effect, both in a cued and an 
uncued condition. This can not quite be interpreted to correspond 
to what we referred to as biographical priming because the ad hoc 
categorizing principle is probably not stored in semantic memory.
In summary, associative priming has been operationally defined 
for people who are predictive of each other. In practice, this pro-
cedure gives rise to pairs of people who (1) are closely associated 
together, (2) who are talked about in the same breath, and (3) who 
are seen together. The pairs to be used in Experiment 1 to detect 
biographical priming have none of these properties. This priming 
is neither associative nor categorical. Members of each pair share 
one concept or trait or feature which (a) does not define them, 
(b) became associated with them after they became famous, and 
(c) is not predictive of their occupational category. Experiment 
1 investigates whether these non-associative and non-categorical 
links produce priming on a double name familiarity-decision task.
5.1 method
5.1.1 Participants
Twenty undergraduates from the University of Tromsø volunteered 
to take part in this experiment. Eleven were female and nine were 
male. Mean age was 26.1 years (SD = 7). Ratings were done by 
participants from the same university within a similar age range 
and a majority of women.
5.1.2 Stimuli
Four lists of pairs of names were used in this experiment. One list 
comprised 12 pairs of names of celebrities who were related non-
categorically and non-associatively by virtue of sharing a single 
piece of biographical information. A pilot study was conducted in 
which 10 participants were asked if they were familiar with both 
celebrities in the pair, and if they could identify the link between 
them. Only pairs where over 60% of the pilot participants could 
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the results in terms of the SNR are not directly comparable to that 
of the previous simulation using reaction times as the depend-
ent variable, it reflects the requirements of the empirical learning 
paradigm under investigation.
The plot in Figure 4 shows the long-term behavior of the SNR 
for the case of unrelated pairs (control condition) and one and four 
SIU-overlap. Clearly, the more nodes that were shared initially, the 
higher the SNR after a sufficiently long training phase. Also, the 
slope of the three curves increases with number of overlapping 
features, indicating that this difference will continue to grow with 
further learning steps. A 3 (shared features: 0, 1, 4) × 30 (learn-
steps) within-subject (within-net) ANOVA showed a main effect for 
shared features, F(5,20) = 3.44, p < 0.05, a main effect for learning, 
F(29,116) = 33.87, p < 0.001, and an interaction, F(145,580) = 3.59, 
p < 0.001. This indicates that the network is able to learn associa-
tions and that there is a difference in learning speed depending on 
the number of initially overlapping features. A one-way ANOVA 
with number of overlapping features as between-subject (between-
net) factor on SNRs after the 30th learning step was significant, 
F(5,24) = 3.13, p < 0.05.
We conclude that our model was able to successfully establish 
a new associative connection between two previously unrelated 
PINs (via a “spare” SIU-link). In addition, the formation of the 
association was faster when one or several SIUs were previously 
shared. The long-term behavior of the SNR across learning steps 
indicates also that this difference will persist even after the associa-
tions are learned sufficiently. These conclusions are in favor of our 
objective to tease out the priming effects via a link-strengthening 
mechanism. Therefore, in Experiment Three we implemented this 
theoretical result in a behavioral experiment using a paired learn-
ing paradigm.
7 experIment 3
In Experiment 3, we investigated biographical priming in a learn-
ing-based paradigm. The main rationale for using this approach 
was to strengthen the supposedly existing link connecting two per-
sons via incidentally shared biographical information. Because it 
was not detectable with a double-familiarity task in Experiment 
2, we opted for a task in which the corresponding links would be 
a representation of the linking feature in their semantic memory 
and that the general knowledge surrounding this particular infor-
mation differs vastly.
Thus, we argue that in order to observe biographical priming, it 
is necessary to increase the experiment’s sensitivity. Hypothetically, 
this can be achieved by (a) an even more sensitive procedure, (b) 
decreasing other sources of variance (by using a more homoge-
neous population of participants or stimuli, for example), or (c) 
strengthening the links between the two PINs and their shared SIU. 
In Experiment 3, we opted for the third of these approaches. Before 
discussing this experiment, we inspect this idea more closely in the 
framework of our computational model.
6 SImulatIon 3: bIographIcal prImIng In a  
paIr-learnIng taSk
We argue that it should in principle be possible to observe priming 
based on a single overlapping SIU in a double-familiarity task and 
attribute our failure to do so in Experiment 2 to the experimental 
procedure that was not sensitive enough to measure the effect. 
We therefore propose to increase the strength of the connectivity 
between the single feature and its associated person representa-
tions by a learning mechanism. The idea is to strengthen any 
PIN
1
 → SIU → PIN
2
 links by repeatedly showing two names 
together and requiring participants to learn to associate them. 
We argue, that the error rate while retrieving this association 
will be affected by whether the two persons share a semantic 
feature or not.
Technically, we implement this idea in the framework of the 
IAC model using a technique similar to the one employed by 
Burton (1994) where new faces were learned using a Hebb-like 
link-updating rule. We realized the model-equivalent of a pair-
learning and cued-recall task: We activated two distinct NRUs 
that shared or did not share SIUs and adapted all synaptic weights 
between all pools according to the Hebb rule (see the Appendix for 
details of the simulation). This is the equivalent of pairwise name- 
or face-learning. Note, that in order to compare retrieval perform-
ance of unrelated and related pairs, the model had to contain 
means of learning to associate two previously unrelated persons. 
We employed the same mechanism used in Burton (1994): We 
created a random, fixed network that corresponds to the current 
semantic memory of a person. In addition, we added a number 
of “spare” SIUs, that were weakly (and randomly) coupled to the 
PINs. In the unrelated condition, one of these spare nodes was 
eventually going to be converted to act as the active link between 
the two presented persons.
After the learning phase, we activated only one of the two 
learned names and observed how the activity in the system 
behaved. This is a straight-forward implementation of a cued-
recall task, where participants, given one name of the pair, have 
to retrieve the associated other name. In a behavioral experiment, 
we observed error rates (see Experiment 3) and we argue that the 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the PIN level (as defined in Eq. 
2, see Appendix) is an adequate modeling equivalent, because it 
is related to the likelihood of retrieving the correct name in the 
presence of spurious activity (the noise). The higher the SNR, the 
better the two persons can be distinguished from the activity of 
all other PINs and the higher the accuracy of responding. While 
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Figure 4 | Signal-to-noise ratio (SNr) as a function of learning step and 
initial overlap in the pool of Sius. Each plotted point contains data from five 
random networks and five repetitions with each network/overlap condition. 
The error-bars show the Standard Error of the Mean (SEM).
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rated according to the similarity of what the celebrities do and what 
they are known for, and how alike they are in what they meant to 
the rater, with 1 as minimum and 7 as maximum.
The same lists were also used for ratings of two other types of 
similarity within the pairs: Name similarity and visual similarity. The 
instructions for the name similarity ratings were to rate how similar 
the two names in each pair sounded, on a scale from 1 (meaning 
“completely unlike”) to 7 (meaning “extremely similar-sounding”). 
They were explicitly told to try to ignore what they knew about 
the people themselves and to only focus on the names. The visual 
similarity instructions asked participants to rate how physically alike 
the celebrities were, and told them to try to ignore similarity “due 
to profession, for example,” on the same seven-point scale. All three 
sheets had a box to tick in the case of not knowing a celebrity. A total 
of 99 people participated in these procedures: 31 rated semantic 
similarity, 37 rated name similarity, and 31 rated visual similarity.
In addition to the biographically related pairs, a set of pairs 
containing visually similar people was compiled. The types of 
visual similarity included physiognomic similarity, similar hair-
dos, similar glasses and similarly protruding ears. Seven such pairs 
and seven visually dissimilar pairs were included as fillers in the 
experiment in order to avoid ceiling effects in the learning of the 
biographical pairs.
7.1.3 Design
There were two factors in this experiment: a within-subjects factor 
of Biographical Priming, with the levels of Related and Unrelated, 
and a between-subject factor of Subgroup. The latter ensured that 
for any participant each celebrity appeared in only one condition, 
and that all celebrities appeared equally often in the Related and 
Unrelated conditions across the experiment. The dependent vari-
able was the number of errors made during the learning procedure.
7.1.4 Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet lab and the experi-
ment was run on a PC using ERTS software. They were instructed 
to try to remember the pairs of names that would be presented. 
After two runs through each pair, they would have to try to recall 
one name when given the other. Fourteen biographically related 
pairs (seven related and seven unrelated) and 14 visual pairs (seven 
related and seven unrelated) were presented in the same random 
order to all participants. On each trial a cross was presented on the 
screen for 750 ms, followed by the pair of names for 5 s, and with an 
inter-trial interval of 2 s (see Figure 5). A different random order 
was used for the second presentation. Then the test phase of the 
experiment began, with one name being presented on the screen, 
and the participant had to recall the person’s “partner.” The response 
was recorded by a research assistant, blind to the hypotheses of 
the experiment. For commission and omission errors, the correct 
name was provided by the experimenter. Each of the 28 names in 
biographically related pairs and the 28 names in visual pairs was 
presented five times, in a different random order for each partici-
pant (with the constraints that names from the same pair could 
not be presented consecutively and no more than 2 names from the 
same condition could be presented consecutively). The experiment 
was terminated in cases where the participant made no errors for 
any pair for three consecutive presentations.
strengthened. Based on the results from our simulations in the 
previous section, we implemented the discussed mechanism using a 
pairwise association-learning and cued-recall task, arguing that any 
semantic connections between persons would manifest in better 
learning/recall performance.
7.1 method
7.1.1 Participants
Fifty-five people from the undergraduate and postgraduate popula-
tion of the University of Tromsø were recruited in the preparation 
of the pairs of celebrities. Their average age was 25 years, and 34 
were women, and they received no remuneration. Ninety-nine peo-
ple were recruited from the same population to rate the pairs for 
similarity, 79 of whom were women, and the overall average age was 
23 years. Twenty-two people, also from the same population, were 
recruited for the experiment proper, their average age was 24 years 
and 14 of them were women. The experimental group received a 
scratch card worth around two EUR for taking part.
7.1.2 Stimuli
The experimenters generated a list of 43 pairs of celebrities linked 
by a biographical feature and not from the same occupational cat-
egory or in any standard way associated to each other. Then 50 
participants were tested individually and for each pair were asked 
to say what the unique link was. For cases where they indicated that 
they could not generate the link themselves, the experimenter told 
them the link, and the participant had to say whether or not they 
could confirm the link, i.e., whether they now remembered it. In 
this way 14 of the original pairs passed the criteria of at least 40 of 
the 50 participants either generating or recognizing the link within 
the pair, e.g., Princess Diana–James Dean (died in a car crash), 
Gianni Versace–Olof Palme (murdered with a gun). See Table A5 
in Appendix for all pairs and their linking features.
To create the counterbalancing factor, these pairs were divided 
into two subgroups of seven related pairs. Within each group, the 
seven pairs were then shuffled to create seven unrelated pairs. Five 
people were recruited and challenged to try to find links between 
the unrelated pairs. Initially some spurious links were found but 
after a couple of reshuffles, the strongest links remaining were of 
the type “both are famous,” “both like money,” “both have been 
interviewed by the same man.” In other words, the Unrelated pairs 
were neither associatively nor categorically related, and nor did they 
share consensual central biographical features.
Notwithstanding the fact that within each pair the celebrities came 
from different professional categories and that even the celebrities in 
the related pairs were not at all predictive of each other in the way that 
associative pairs are, we wished to establish how similar these people 
within the pairs were in other ways. It is conceivable for example that 
people may be judged as similar, not due to shared occupational 
category, but more to a vague compatibility due to, for instance, how 
rich or “provincial” or charming or happy they are perceived to be. 
In order to take account of this sort of personal similarity a further 
ratings procedure was undertaken. Two lists were made, each contain-
ing seven biographically related pairs and seven unrelated pairs, with 
each celebrity appearing in the related condition in one list and the 
unrelated in the other. The pairs were presented in a random order 
on a sheet of paper. The instructions said that the pairs should be 
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The high correlation between rated Personal similarity and 
Biographical condition raises the possibility that the significant 
main effect of biographical priming found on the ANOVA was 
due to personal relatedness rather than to the single shared bio-
graphical feature. A multiple regression was carried out with the 
mean number of errors per pair as the dependent variable, and the 
independent variables of rated personal similarity, name similarity, 
visual similarity, Subgroup, and Biographical condition. This gave 
a significant model, F(5,22) = 3.01, p < 0.05, with an adjusted r2 of 
0.27. The only significant independent variable used in the model 
was Biographical condition, b = 0.79, t = 2.8, p < 0.05; Personal 
similarity: b = 0.24, t = 0.80, ns; Name similarity: b = −0.06, t = 0.33, 
ns; Visual similarity: b = 0.002, t = 0.01, ns; Subgroup: b = −0.06, 
t = −0.33, ns. This suggests that the factor of Biographical condi-
tion is directly related to the number of errors made, and that the 
correlation between personal similarity and errors only emerges 
because of the former’s correlation with Biographical condition.
As described in the Procedure section, participants were asked 
to tell the experimenter how they had learned the pairs. Just under 
half the participants reported looking for similarities between the 
names or visual appearance to aid them in the task. Despite this, of 
course, visual similarity did not correlate significantly with number 
of errors. Five participants reported looking for common semantic 
features, but no participant came up with an observation regarding 
the links via a single biographical feature.
7.3 dIScuSSIon
As predicted by the simulations, participants made fewer errors 
when learning to associate pairs of celebrities related by a single 
biographical feature than unrelated pairs. This indicates that the 
biographical link present for these pairs eased learning to associate 
the two persons. In addition, the result was shown not to be due to 
visual similarity or name similarity or ratings of how similar the 
people in the pairs were.
This “biographical priming”-effect can best be explained by the 
notion of spreading activation through semantically related mem-
ory representations: The pairwise learning procedure strengthened 
the PIN → SIU → PIN links producing a stronger and less-error 
prone association manifested in lower error rates. Notably, the 
found effect is incompatible with associative accounts of memory-
organization for people. In order to complete the experimental 
task, participants had to form associations between two previously 
unrelated persons, i.e., in terms of Barry et al.’s (1998) model, an 
After the test phase was over, participants were first asked to 
indicate whether any of the celebrities were not known to them, 
and then to introspect on how they had learned each of the pairs. 
Then they were presented with each visual and biographical pair 
one by one, both the related and unrelated, and asked to say what 
the two people had in common. Then participants were debriefed 
and thanked.
7.2 reSultS
There were eight occasions on which a participant reported not 
knowing a celebrity – four in the Related condition and four in the 
Unrelated – and these data were discarded. For the remaining cells, 
the mean number of errors during learning made by each partici-
pant for each pair in the Related condition was 2.1 (SD = 2.0), and 
for the Unrelated condition was 3.6 (SD = 2.1). A two-way analysis 
of variance with the factors of Biographical Priming and Subgroup 
showed a main effect of Biographical Priming, F(1,18) = 12.9, 
p < 0.005, but none of Subgroup, F(1,18) < 1. The interaction 
was not significant either, F(1,18) = 3.0, ns. Parenthetically, we 
note that the same pattern was obtained for the visual pairs: the 
mean number of errors was 2.1 (SD = 2.0) for Related and 3.8 
(SD = 2.1) for Unrelated. A two-way ANOVA showed a main effect 
of Relatedness, F(1,18) = 24.1, p < 0.005, but neither a main effect 
of Subgroup nor an interaction, F(1,18) < 1, and F(1,18) = 2.6, ns.
A two-way ANOVA was also performed with items as random 
factor. Both factors (Biographical Priming and Subgroup) were 
between-items factors, and of the three sources of variance only 
Biographical Priming was significant, F(1,12) = 16.1, p < 0.005; 
Subgroup: F(1,12) < 1; Interaction: F(1,12) = 2.7, ns. The bio-
graphical priming was thus significant by participants and by items.
Pearson correlations were used to investigate associations 
between the number of errors made for the 28 pairs (the 14 related 
pairs and the 14 unrelated pairs), the mean obtained for each pair 
from the three similarity ratings procedures, and Biographical 
condition (Related or Unrelated). The number of errors made 
correlated negatively with all three ratings, but only significantly 
so for personal similarity, Personal: r = −0.42,p < 0.05; Name: 
r = −0.20, ns; Visual: r = −0.24, ns. For Biographical condition, 
Visual similarity also showed a significant association, Personal: 
r = −0.81, p < 0.001; Name: r = −0.31, ns; Visual: r = −0.38, p < 0.05. 
Personal and Name similarity correlated significantly with each 
other r = 0.42, p < 0.05, but no other correlation between ratings 
was significant.
750 ms 5 s
James Dean
Princess Diana
2 s
Learning Phase
. . .
28 pairs, 2 times each
. . .
750 ms unlimited
James Dean
Recall Phase
. . .
56 names, 5 times each
. . . Michael Jackson
750 ms unlimited750 ms
Figure 5 | experimental procedure in experiment 3.
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stored in a shared memory storage and activation flows between a 
person’s representation and the associated semantic information, 
the facilitation can be explained by simple link-strengthening.
Biographical priming as reported in this study has not been 
detected earlier. Previous attempts failed to find evidence for a 
shared storage of biographical features (Darling and Valentine, 
2005): While these authors were able to demonstrate stable RPI-
effects for categorically related persons, they did not find an effect 
for persons sharing a biographical feature (nationality) if they were 
not previously cued to attend to that feature. A potential explana-
tion for the divergent findings is based on the distinctiveness of the 
shared biographical feature. While the same nationality is shared 
by many other people, there are much fewer that, e.g., lost part of 
their ear. In the IAC model, the more PINs activated by a shared 
SIU, the stronger the inhibition in the pool, leading essentially to a 
weaker SIU-based activation of the nodes. It would be interesting to 
compare the differences of our approach and the RPI-paradigm in 
a computational model in order to investigate this distinctiveness-
based effect in more detail.
In the spirit of Caramazza and Shelton’s (1998) domain-spe-
cific theory of semantic memory, several case studies have recently 
reported circumscribed deficits of semantic knowledge about peo-
ple, e.g., Kay and Hanley (1999) or Miceli et al. (2000), and one a 
preservation (Kay and Hanley, 2002). Showing priming on a bio-
graphical priming task with such a patient with a preservation of 
knowledge about people (for example using a non-verbal matching 
variant of the task used here) would demonstrate preserved seman-
tic knowledge beyond the levels of categories, to specific details 
one knows about a person. Conversely, patients with a deficit in 
semantic knowledge about people would be expected to show no 
biographical priming.
When Stanhope and Cohen (1993) used a learning paradigm 
to test Burton et al.’s model, Bruce et al. (1994) argued that their 
“steady-state” model could not be tested by acquisition experi-
ments. While we would agree with this in general, the prediction 
we are testing arises directly from the structure of current IAC 
models, and so tests them “in principle.” Assuming the validity of 
the IAC model, our experiment does not modify the underlying 
network in memory. Rather, we opted to strengthen the assumed 
linkage in order to be able to observe the subtle biographical prim-
ing effect. We argue that this approach is compatible with the IAC 
model because we exclusively applied modeling strategies that have 
previously been used in the IAC model’s framework: The link-
strengthening mechanism is essentially the same as the one used 
in Burton et al.’s (1990) initial paper for explaining the identity-
priming effect. The mechanism used to enable the model to acquire 
new associations has been used in the context of the IAC model to 
account for the learning of new faces (Burton, 1994).
More speculatively, we could interpret our results as consistent 
with the idea that categories are not represented per se but that 
categorical priming effects are rather based on the spreading activa-
tion through a large number of such biographical details. This idea 
is in line with classical studies on typicality (Rosch, 1975) showing 
that typical items of a category are faster categorized than untypi-
cal ones: Typical items share more features (SIUs in terms of the 
IAC model) and thus reach threshold faster when activated. From 
this viewpoint, both the associative and categorical priming effect 
associative bond had to be created. If this process is as claimed 
independent of the semantics, there is no reason to believe that 
bonds should be more efficiently created when the persons shared 
a single semantic feature.
Our experimental setup bears some similarity to the re-learning 
savings reported in a prosopagnostic patient: When the patient had 
to learn a name of a person that could not be identified overtly, the 
patient performed better when the name was the true name of the 
face (de Haan et al., 1987). Participants in our experiment behaved 
not unlike this patient, showing an advantage in a learning task 
due to links in the semantic system of which they were unaware. In 
addition, face–name priming effects similar to healthy subjects were 
reported for the patient (de Haan et al., 1987) which strengthens 
our argument that the learning and priming paradigms test the 
same underlying structure.
8 general dIScuSSIon
The experiments and simulations in this paper elaborated on sev-
eral aspects of the semantic system dealing with knowledge of peo-
ple. In the first part of the paper, we showed both conceptually and 
empirically that the double-familiarity task is a much more sensitive 
experimental paradigm than the commonly used single-familiarity 
task to investigate subtle semantic priming effects. Experiment 1 
showed stable categorical and associative priming which were, in 
fact, statistically indistinguishable (although the associate priming 
effect was numerically bigger). Given these results ensuring the 
paradigm’s sensitivity, we concluded that it should in principle be 
possible to observe a priming effect that is based only on incidental 
and peripheral information.
However, we failed to find this “biographical priming” effect 
with a simple double-familiarity task in Experiment 2 which led 
us to strengthen the underlying semantic connectivity to reveal the 
predicted effect. Simulation results were promising because stable 
differences in terms of SNR during cued retrieval persisted even 
after all associations had been well-learned. Consistent with these 
considerations, we were able to find a biographically related effect on 
error rates in a pairwise learning and recall task in Experiment 3. The 
effect emerged despite the fact that participants were largely unable 
to pinpoint the key links within the related pairs, and reported using 
other strategies to learn to associate the celebrities’ names.
This type of priming is a conceptually intriguing effect because 
it is distinct from both associative and categorical priming: It is 
not based on general compatibility between the pairs of people, 
but more specifically can be traced to single semantic features that 
they share. We are thus able to go beyond previous research that 
could show that categorical relations are represented in semantic 
memory: Even isolated features that are common for two persons 
lead to a facilitation in learning. Strictly speaking, we cannot con-
clude that this effect is due to shared storage of semantic infor-
mation. Barry et al. (1998) argued that semantic information is 
stored redundantly with each identity and that implicit access to 
this information can create a link between similar semantics. The 
same argument holds for results from studies on categorical prim-
ing. Still, a spreading activation-like mechanism is necessary to 
account for the unconscious formation of between-person links 
and assuming a shared semantic storage seems to be the most natu-
ral explanation for the found effects: If the biographical detail is 
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we like to think about SIUs as an abstraction: The assumption 
of distinct SIUs is merely a crude model for the real situation 
and does not need to have a physical equivalent. So rather than 
directly assuming distinct nodes for “died in a car crash” and “died 
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the activity can spread.
In summary, we accumulated empirical evidence for the idea 
that single features and episodes are stored in a shared pool giving 
rise to between-person priming effects based on only incidentally 
shared information. These results are consistent with IAC models 
of person recognition, which we could show using computational 
simulations.
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would really be biographical priming with different numbers of 
overlapping features. This has interesting consequences for how 
semantic priming effects should be modulated by, e.g., typicality 
(typical actors will share more features with other typical actors) or 
semantic distinctiveness (persons that have a lot of unshared SIUs 
would be processed faster than those having a lot of SIUs shared 
with many other people).
The IAC model implies that association between people is always 
via a semantic link. This might seem to conflict with intuition when 
considering pairwise learning paradigms in which participants are 
directly ask to associate a given pair of people. In our implementa-
tion, the association was created via spare SIUs. In reality, this would 
correspond to crafting a unique semantic link that connects the 
pair. When arguing, that SIUs are episodic in nature, SIUs of the 
sort “I have seen Princess Diana and Michael Jackson together in an 
experiment at the Psychology Department” can be assumed to be 
created for completely unrelated persons. Stone (2008) took a simi-
lar perspective, when arguing that close associates are related via a 
particularly strong node in the SIU-pool. This consideration makes 
explicit the question about what is actually stored in a single SIU.
Our proposal above to have isolated a feature corresponding to a 
single SIU in Burton et al.’s (1990) IAC model is a simplification to 
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content is stored in an SIU? In our experiments, we presented pairs 
of people for whom we claimed that they shared a specific feature, 
like “died in a car accident,” but note that here we could just as well 
have written “died in an accident” or “died an unnatural death.”
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appendIx
1 model formalISm
The basic model is the same as used by Burton et al. (1990). We 
give a formulation that is based on ordinary differential equations 
(ODE’s) rather than the discrete difference equations used pre-
viously. This is a more useful formalism as it is (i) continuous, 
(ii) mathematically and conceptually more specific, and (iii) it 
avoids numerical artifacts due to a coarse discretization (because 
the discrete step-size can be adjusted to compensate for them – 
this is not possible in the original model). Note however, that the 
ODE-formulation is equivalent (up to multiplication with a con-
stant) to the previous formulation by McClelland and Rumelhart 
(1990) when a simple discretization scheme is used. An imple-
mentation written in the R environment for statistical computing 
R Development Core Team (2010) of the model is available for 
download (http://www.nld.ds.mpg.de/∼ihrke/iac.html).
We define the net input j
i
(t) to node i by
 
j di ji j j
j
t I w a a( )= + ( )∑ext Θ
where Θ is the Heaviside step-function
 
Θ( )x
x
=
≥
1 0
0
if
otherwise
(this ensures that negative activations do not spread). We define 
a coupled system of ODE’s that approach I
max
 when the input is 
excitatory and I
min
 when it is inhibitory
da
dt
I a a I I ai i i i i i i i= ( ) −( ) + − ( )  −( ) + −( )Θ Θj j j j bmax min rest1
(note that only one of the first two terms is non-zero). A list of 
parameters included in this model is given in Table A2. A simple 
discretization scheme yields the discrete-system equations intro-
duced in McClelland and Rumelhart (1990) and used in Burton 
et al. (1990):
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2 random connectIvIty
In all simulations, we randomly create networks subject to the fol-
lowing constraints: Networks consist of N
PIN
 persons (i.e., N
PIN
 FRU/
NRUs and N
PIN
 PINs) and a pool of N
SIU
 SIU. The average number 
of connections from PIN i to the SIU-pool, N
i → SIU
, is distributed 
according to a normal distribution with mean m
i → SIU
 = 10 and SD 
σ
i → SIU
 = 2. Connections between a PIN and the SIUs are created 
by drawing N
i → SIU
 times without replacement from {1,…, N
SIU
}. 
It was necessary to fix the network size and the expected number 
of connections in order to find reasonable parameter settings that 
could reproduce the behavior seen in previous simulations (i.e., 
semantic priming effects etc.).
3 experIment 1 and 2 SImulatIon detaIlS
These simulations contrasted the single- and the double- familiarity-
decision task. In Simulation 1, a single NRU node was subjected to 
external input until the network had settled down (t
c
 = 200 time-
units) and the network was investigated after having turned off 
the external input (400 time-units). At this point, all activations 
that were above zero were recorded (because these will result in a 
semantic priming effect when subsequently activated).
In Simulation 2, the setup was identical except that two NRU-
nodes that shared a given number of features received external 
input. In this case, familiarity decisions to individual PINs were 
taken whenever a
i
(t) > u and the reaction time was recorded as 
min{t|a
i
(t) > u}, i.e., the threshold-crossing time.
4 experIment 3 SImulatIon detaIlS
For the learning experiment, we used a methodology that was 
similar to the one employed by Burton (1994) to account for the 
learning of new faces. All between-pool connection-strengths were 
adapted using a Hebb-like learning rule
w w a t a t a t a t wi j
l
i j
l
i c j c i c j c i j
l
, , ,sgn
+
= + ( ) ( ) − ( ) ( )( ) 1 1λ  (1)
for i and j from different pools. The index l ∈ {1,…, L} symbolizes 
the learning step (which is not to be confused with the number 
of presentations in the actual behavioral experiment). λ is a free 
parameter that indicates the “rate of learning.”
In order to enable the formation of new associations, we kept 
a number of “spare” SIUs that were modeled to have a random 
PIN ↔ SIU weight h that was drawn uniformly from [−h
max
, h
max
]. 
This procedure is subject to the same constraints and shortcom-
ings already discussed by Burton (1994) but worked well in our 
simulations.
The learning phase was modeled by simultaneously presenting 
a pair of nodes A = (i, j) that are to be associated. After letting the 
network settle down (t
c
 = 80), we adapted the synaptic weights using 
Eq. 1 and started the next learning phase. When a fixed number of 
learning steps L = 30 had been presented, the model entered the 
cued-recall (testing) phase, where the network was presented with 
each of the previously learned stimuli and allowed to converge.
We report the results of the model in terms of the signal-to-noise 
ratio (SNR) at the cued-recall phase. We define the SNR in the 
context of our model to be the root-mean-square (RMS) activa-
tion at time t of the target PINs divided by the RMS-activation of 
all other PINs
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t
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(2)
Here, # A = 2 denotes the number of activated NRUs corresponding 
to the pair of names that have been learned in the learning phase 
of the experiment. In the main article, we reported the mean of the 
SNR when probing with A
1
 and A
2
 at time t
c
, respectively.
5 experImental materIal
The celebrities used in our experiments are presented in 
Tables A3–A5.
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Table A3 | The associated pairs of stimuli used in experiment 1 along 
with the common category.
 Persons Category
Geri Halliwell Robbie Williams International pop-stars
Lene Nystrøm Morten Harket
Nils Ole Oftebro Thomas Giertsen Norwegian satirists
Harald Eia Bård Tufte Johansen
Brad Pitt Jennifer Aniston Actors (international)
Tom Cruise Nicole Kidman
Bruce Willis Demi Moore
Michael Douglas Catherine Zeta-Jones
Herman Kristoffersen Alvhild Yttergård Norwegian politicians
Kåre Willoch Jan P. Syse
Jens Stoltenberg Thorbjørn Jagland
Kjetil Andre Aamot Lasse Kjus Norwegian skiers
Vegard Ulvang Bjørn Daehlie
Jahn Teigen Anita Skorgan Musicians
Sissel Kyrkjebrø Eddie Skoller
Harald Heide Steen Rolv Wesenlund Norwegian comedians
Knut Lystad Lars Mjøen
Arthur Arntzen Tore Skoglund
Table A1 | Variable names occurring in the formulation of the model.
Variable Meaning
t Time, t ∈ [0, T]
ai(t) Node potential (dependent variables)
Iext External input, Iext ∈ {0, 1}
wij Connection matrix (weights), wij ∈ [−1, 1]
Table A2 | Model parameters and their values in the different 
simulations.
Parameter Meaning experiment
  1 2 and 3
globAl PArAMeTerS
Imax Maximal input strength 1.0 1.0
Imin Minimal input strength −0.2 −0.2
Irest Resting potential −0.1 −0.1
b Decay constant for all nodes 0.09 0.1
d External coupling constant 0.4 0.8
a Between-pool, excitatory 0.1 0.15
 coupling strength
g Within-pool, inhibitory −0.1 −0.1
 coupling strength
u Familiarity-decision threshold – 0.6
λ Learning rate – 0.05
hmax Maximum strength of – 0.1
 initial connections
NeTworK CoNNeCTiViTy
NPIN Number of persons 20 20
NSIU Number of SIU 60 80
Nspare Number of spare SIU – 20
mi → SIU, σi → SIU Distribution of connections 10, 2 10, 2
 from PIN i to SIU
Table A4 | The related pairs of stimuli used in experiment 2, with their 
single related feature.
 Persons Shared biographical detail
Prinsesse Diana James Dean Died in a car crash
Terje Søviknes Mick Jagger Caught being unfaithful
Kurt Cobain Marilyn Monroe Drugs overdose
Desmond Tutu Lech Walesa Human rights advocates
Prinsesse Victoria Ally McBeal Eating disorder
Anja Andersen Ståle Solbakken Heart problems
Evander Holyfield Vincent van Gogh Missing part of ear
Kong Carl Gustav Hugh Grant Visiting striptease bar
Kjell Magne Bondevik Bjørn Eidsvåg Trained as priests
Arve Juritzen Per Kristian Foss Homosexual
Matthew Perry Ari Behn Drug addicts
Jan Simonsen Puff Daddy Involved in shooting
Ihrke and Brennen Biographical priming
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Table A5 | The related pairs of stimuli used in experiment 3, with their 
single related feature.
 Persons Shared biographical detail
Prinsesse Diana James Dean Died in a car crash
Jahn Teigen Tande P. Failed business venture
Marie Fredriksson Wenche Foss Survived cancer
Ben Johnson Johan Mühlegg Drug cheats
Arve Juritzen Per Kristian Foss Homosexual
Matthew Perry Whitney Houston Alcohol problems
Nils Arne Eggen Kåre Valebrokk Smokers’ rights advocates
Gianni Versace Olof Palme Shot and killed
Calista Flockhart Kronprinsesse Victoria Eating disorder
Kurt Cobain Marilyn Monroe Drugs overdose
Hugh Grant Michael Jackson Sexual pecadillo
Kjell Magne Bondevik Bjørn Eidsvåg Trained as priests
Anne Mona Suleiman Bill Clinton Caught being unfaithful
Mia Hundvin George Michael Bisexual
Ihrke and Brennen Biographical priming
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